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INTRQDUCTICM
A large urban earthquake can create sudden, large demands for shelter 
for the urban poor. Two recent earthquakes •—  one in Mexico City and the 
other in San Salvador illustrate the problems that urban planners may 
face in future urban disasters. Certain groups of disaster victims are 
extremely difficult to reach with conventional assistance and normal 
post-earthquake reconstruction strategies. These recent experiences are 
forcing planners to re-examine post-disaster shelter strategies and to 
develop new programs and approaches to provide suitable interim shelter 
and. replacement housing. These events have also forced a re—examination 
of the temporary shelter strategies which have became widely accepted in 
the last decade.
Since the great Guatemala earthquake of 1976, most relief agencies 
have de-emphasized the so-called "ABC" approach —  that is, the initial 
provision of emergency shelter followed by temporary housing which, in 
turn, is followed by reconstruction of permanent housing. In the 
Guatemalan experience, which was primarily rural, many agencies chose to 
use a transitional approach (the forerunner of the "shelter-to-housing" 
concept), providing shelter materials that could be reused in permanent 
reconstruction, thereby going .immediately from stage A to stage C and 
omitting the temporary housing phase. The majority of damages in 
Guatemala, however, were to rural single-family housing, to individual 
squatter housing, and to isolated individual housing units in the lower- 
income neighborhoods in Guatemala City. Damages to multi-family buildings 
were minimal.
O^SSmcaTICN OF DISASTER VICTIMS IN AN IIRRAN FMFRGFMCV
In the two earthquakes discussed here, five different types of low-
income urban victims could be identified. These were:
A. Squatters
In San Salvador, a large percentage of the victims were squatters who 
resided on marginal sites such as the banks of steep ravines, along 
railroad tracks, and on public lands or other sites that had been 
occupied illegally. (A large number of the victims were displaced
persons who had moved to the city to escape the violence of the civil 
war in the countryside.) Most of their houses were constructed of 
lightweight materials such as corrugated iron sheeting, cardboard, and 
wooden timbers. Mich of the damage suffered by this group was not 
from the collapse of housing, however, but from landslides.
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S • Urban Self-Help Builders With Secure Tenure
In a number of cases, urban poor have been able to secure small but 
adequate sites on a permanent basis. In San Salvador, private 
agencies, and in some cases the government, had been able to purchase 
large, unoccupied tracts and turn them over* to low—income self-help 
builders. On these sites, a wide variety of non-engineered buildings 
were erected, many of low-quality earthen materials such as bajareque, 
unreinforced masonry and, in a few cases, low-quality adobe.
In Mexico city, only a few individually—owned, low— income houses were 
damaged by the earthquake, due primarily to the fact that most of the 
damage was centralized in the center of the city.
C. Occupants of Public Housing
In both Mexico City and San Salvador, a high degree of loss was 
sustained by publicly-financed, high-rise public housing. The most 
dramatic failures occurred in the Tlatalolco Complex and the Benito 
Juarez site in Mexico City where over 1,000 people were killed in the 
collapse of ^ four buildings. In San Salvador, a substantial number of 
public housing units were also damaged, although, without the catastro­
phic failures seen in Mexico City. However, due to cracking and the 
potential for aftershocks, many of the buildings were unsafe for 
immediate occupancy, and surveys indicated that few of the seriously- 
damaged buildings could be immediately repaired.
D - Occupants of Sincfle-Familv Rental Housing
A small percentage (although a large number) of individual rental 
housing units were damaged in both earthquakes. For the most part, 
people living in single-family housing were at the upper end of the 
low-income range. Providing replacement housing for this group proved 
to be relatively easy because landlords were generally wealthy enough 
to repair or reconstruct the buildings and, since the housing was a 
source of income, were generally willing to do so quickly. In the 
case of buildings that coaid be repaired, owners often agreed to 
reduce rents if the tenants would do the repair work. There were also 
a number of owners who sold the property to tenants that could afford 
to purchase the houses with the assistance of non-governmental 
agencies and loans from specially-created reconstruction funds.
s * Occupants of Multi-Family Rental Housing
This group prayed to be the most problematic of all. In both earth­
quakes, the majority of people that were affected resided in this type 
of building. In Mexico City, over 44,000 families, or almost a 
quarter of a million people, lived in multi-family slum buildings
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known as vecindades; in San Salvador, 15,855 families, or approxi­
mately half the occupants of damaged buildings, lived in similar 
buildings known as mesones.1 A closer look at the vecindades 
prior to the earthquake will illustrate some of the problems.
Vecindades were commercial buildings converted to tenements at the 
turn of the century as a way of holding the land until such time that 
it would be economically feasible to build factories. Within several 
decades, hundreds of thousands of people lived in these small, cramped 
areas. Most were one-room structures, crammed around long, narrow 
passageways, without adequate water or sanitary facilities.
The quality of construction of the vecindades was poor. In many 
cases, property owners simply subdivided the interior space with adobe 
walls laid directly on the ground with no foundation or other type of 
reinforcement. The roofs were made of logs covered with earthen 
material, later replaced by concrete slabs. Few of the buildings had 
any internal structural integrity and it was easy for the earthquake 
to transfer forces from one living unit to another, quickly damaqinq 
all of them beyond repair.
By ^1948, conditions had become so bad that the government froze the 
rents in an attempt to force landowners to improve the buildings. 
Instead, the owners tried to evict the tenants and the government was 
forced to issue a further order to the landowners stipulating that 
they could only evict tenants if the structures were totally 
uninhabitable. For the next thirty-eight years, relatively few 
improvements ^ were made to the buildings except by the tenants. The 
density continued to increase and, by the time of the earthquake, had 
reached incredible levels. In one eighty-block area, almost a quarter 
of a million people lived in vecindades. In many cases, the original 
landlords had long since sold the property to lard speculators who 
simply collected what marginal rents they could get and otherwise 
ignored the properties and their conditions.
1
Assess^nL_Report;__ Estimated Damages in the Housing Sector Caused by
the-. .October— 1986 San Salvador Earthquake and Suggested Reconstruction 
Strategies, INTERTECT, Dallas, October 1986. - ---
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COMMON RECONSTRUCTION STRATECTRq
Ihe most common reconstruction strategies include: shelter-to-housing 
programs, i*e., the provision of building materials such as corrugated 
iron sheets, timber, etc., that can be used first as a temporary shelter 
and later incorporated into permanent housing; loans and other forms of 
credit? and relocation to other homes or sites. The shelter-to-housing 
strategy (which evolved from experiences in Guatemala; Andhra Pradesh, 
India; and more recently, Popayan, Columbia) worked well with squatters 
and urban self-help builders with secure tenure. Loans and credit 
mechanisms also worked well with those two groups. Relocation strategies, 
which are highly favored by the World Bank and other major lending 
institutions, can work only for small numbers, since the cost of land 
acquisition, installation of services and housing construction are 
generally fairly high. Furthermore, few people have been willing to 
relocate to sites outside, a disaster-affected area.
This leaves large numbers of the last three categories —  occupants of 
rental housing of all types (generally the largest group of disaster 
victims in an urban area) —  without a suitable strategy for the provision 
of housing or intermediate shelter.
THE COMPLEXITY OF SHELTER STRATEGIES FOR RENTERS
Of all the groups affected by urban disasters, renters of multi-family 
properties have proven to be the most problematic. Foremost is the issue 
of land. In any urban area, good sites are very expensive. In both 
Mexico City and San Salvador, the majority of vecindades and mesones were 
located in the heart of the city, on land which load not only residential 
but also commercial and, in some cases, industrial potential. In most 
situations, owners would have preferred to evict the tenants and build 
other types of structures.
The second and, in many ways the most important, question is who to 
assist in reconstruction. No humanitarian agency, few governments, and 
hardly any lending institutions would be willing to give slumlords loans 
or grants to rebuild the properties, since for years they had exploited 
the tenants. To assist them would be tantamount to supporting an unjust 
housing system. On the other hand, if assistance was provided to the 
tenants to rebuild or repair housing on land which they did not own, in 
most countries the tenants would have no protection against eviction once 
the houses were rebuilt. Furthermore, they would be carrying the burden 
for reconstruction without any compensation. (In no cases were relief 
agencies able to work out agreements between owners and tenants to provide 
rent reductions for work or cash put into the reconstruction effort by the 
tenants.)
In many cases, landowners viewed the disaster as an opportunity to 
expel the tenants and convert the land to other uses. With the 
devaluation of the peso, many of the people living in vecindades in Mexico 
City found that, in terms of real income, their individual situation had 
vastly improved; the amount of money they paid in rent decreased with 
devaluation. Thus, when the earthquake occurred, many were paying only a 
small percentage of their income for housing and therefore had more total 
disposable income at their command.
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The earthquake first appeared to give landowners the opportunity for 
which they had been waiting to evict the tenants. Since many of the 
buildings were now unsafe, the tenants could legally be evicted under the 
safety clauses of the Mexican Building Code and the provisions for 
eviction under the rent freeze decree of 1948. But in many cases, the 
landlords simply chose to do nothing. They would neither evict the 
tenants nor do anything to repair the buildings. Without secure title to 
the land, the tenants were unable to obtain credit; thus they were forced 
to decide whether to abandon the site or to risk rebuilding at their own 
expense and hope that the landlord would not evict them later.
For the reconstruction agencies, the operational costs were enormous, 
first, the cost of assembling the land, if the owners were willing to 
sell, was extremely high, since the land was centrally located and had 
value far above any housing that would be placed on it. Even if they 
could assemble the land, the cost of building earthquake resistant 
buildings would also be very high. Any building would have to be multi­
story in order to accommodate all previous residents. Such construction 
can only rarely be carried out by unskilled workers. Therefore, skilled 
contractors, masons and, in some cases, engineers and architects, would 
have to be involved in the construction process, further increasing the 
costs.
The biggest problem, however, was how to get the landlords to sell, 
since most were adopting a "wait and see" approach.
lor the government, the political problems were extremely sensitive.
Mexico City, the majority of people living in vecindades were 
affiliated with political groups hostile to the government, while a 
majority of the landowners were strong supporters of the ruling PRI 
party. In El Salvador, it was estimated that over 90% of the damaged 
mesones were owned by two families, both of which were associated with the 
right-wing party opposed to the present administration. In both cases, 
whatever action was taken by the central government to resolve the land 
issues was likely to create a firestorm of criticism on one side or the 
other. In the case of El Salvador, which has close links to a
conservative U.S. administration, the government had to consider the 
reaction of right-wing senators in the U.S. Republican Party: if they
were offended, the overall aid package to the country might be severely 
reduced.
The Mexican Approach
After several weeks of hard deliberations, President Miguel de la 
Madrid decided to take a bold step on behalf of the tenants. Announcing 
to close associates in October that he was not prepared to see several 
hundred thousand people thrown out into the streets by slumlords 
(especially since they were only a mile from the National Palace), the 
President signed an order which expropriated approximately 60% of the 
vecindades damaged by the tremors. In subsequent months, a comprehensive 
strategy was developed to deal with the issues of land acquisition and 
reconstruction. The land was acquired under the expropriation order and 
government development bonds were issued to the previous landowners.
Carnmunity organizers from the government then went to each vecindad 
and conducted a survey to determine whether the people would prefer to 
move or remain. For those who wished to remain (95%), the groups were 
instructed to form and register either a cooperative or condominium 
association. Once this was done, the government issued a temporary title, 
certifying the names of the previous occupants and assuring them that thev 
could reoccupy the site.
Next, the government cordoned off 50% of the residential streets in 
the affected neignborhoods on which they erected a series of temporary 
shelters, in most cases adjacent to or near each vecindad that was to be 
demolished.
Operating through the Public Works Department, the government 
demolished the buildings, cleared the sites, and then stabilized the 
soils. At that point, tenants were queried to determine whether they 
wanted a contractor selected by the government to rebuild their structure 
or if they preferred to select a voluntary agency to do the work. If a 
voluntary agency was selected, it usually indicated that the people 
preferred some sort of aided self-help housing program but, in fact, only 
a very few chose to rebuild the houses themselves.
As the houses were being erected, the government tried to define a 
suitable loan program. Several different schemes were tried without much 
success as will be explained later. The original intent was to have the 
people borrow the money with the interest going to pay for the bonds given 
to the landowners. However, this proved impractical and, in the end, a 
large majority of the buildings were simply given to the tenants gratis.
The Situation in San Salvador
Unfortunately, the Salvadoran program has lagged far behind that of 
Mexico. President Duarte, unwilling to antagonize the right-wing U.S. 
senators, has ignored calls for expropriation and has unsuccessfully 
sought other ways of freeing up the land. For the most part, few 
reconstruction activities of any significance have taken place and many 
people are still without shelter. In some cases, urban residents have 
reluctantly conclude! that they will have to rebuild houses themselves. 
Since they do not have secure tenure, few are willing to build more than 
marginal structures, most of which are more dangerous in earthquakes than 
the buildings they previously occupied.
Shelter has also been a problem for the renters. Hie government 
refused to cordon off the streets for shelter space, partly because they 
had no plans to help rebuild the multi—family buildings. Therefore, many 
people have been living in self-built shelters made of scavenged materials 
completely unsuitable for long-term occupancy. Efforts to provide 
alternative land for relocating the victims have not yet gotten off the 
ground, since the government has been unable to obtain credit from 
international lending institutions. Many observers feel that the growing 
unrest in the city, and the lack of confidence in the government arising 
from its failure to meet reconstruction needs, are seriously undermining 
the administration.
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IESSCNS LEARNED
Both earthquakes have shown that the concentration of risk in urban 
areas is extremely high and the potential for catastrophic loss is very 
real. Regarding shelter, it is clear that, due to the uncertainty over 
land acquisition, both emergency and long-term shelter strategies must be 
reconsidered. The provision of building materials for same groups may not 
be a suitable approach. In some cases people may not be able to rebuild 
houses; in others, the sites will later be cleared in demolition activi­
ties. Furthermore, it is doubtful that relief agencies will want to 
encourage people to remain on crowded, dense sites that could experience 
further failures during aftershocks.
Due to the long time that may be required to rebuild multi-family 
structures, large numbers of temporary shelters or housing units may be 
needed. The Mexico City approach of cordoning off the streets may be a 
workable approach for providing land for these shelters in cases where 
surrounding buildings are not higher than one or two stories. Expecta­
tions by relief agencies that many people would abandon the sites and move 
in with relatives or friends, or would be willing to relocate to temporary 
shelters some distance from their previous homes, did not prove to be the 
case. Due to uncertainty over the land, most people clung tenaciously to 
their previous site, even at the risk of occupying the buildings during 
the period of strong aftershocks. ^
The importance of having a workable land acquisition strategy is one 
of the major lessons for reconstruction planners. Despite the hostility 
of donors to the idea of expropriation (U.S. AID, the World Bank, and 
other -.ending institutions strongly discourage expropriation and will not 
finance housing built on expropriated properties), it appears to be the 
most viable way that land can be assembled quickly and turned over to the 
occupants. land swaps (providing government land to the previous owners 
m  exchange for the tenant properties), while often promoted, have not 
proven to be a viable option in either Mexico City or San Salvador, nor in 
other cases where they have been proposed. Despite an initial outcry from 
landowners, the vast majority of the Mexican populace applauded President 
de la Madrid when he carried out the expropriation, for sympathy was 
werwhelmtingly with the disaster victims. In most cases, if expropriation 
xs carried out quickly in the aftermath of a disaster, the government 
should not encounter major problems.
The potential importance of expropriation should not be overlooked, 
expropriation is linked to a balanced program of reconstruction and 
urban upgrading, it can provide the basis for major initiatives in urban 
renewal and land reform. It is therefore important that the actions be 
carried out in such a way that they serve as a model for future action. 
To be successful, the government must ensure:
that tiie program is carried out in a reasonable period of time;
that it is equitable to everyone affected, both renters and 
landowners; and
that unreasonable expectations are not generated.
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Both reconstruction programs have encountered a number of operational 
problems that will be of interest to urban planners. Among these, the 
most important is providing loans in an inflationary environment. Since 
the number of people who will require economic assistance is high, most 
governments would prefer to lose sane form of revolving loan program so 
that the benefits of reconstruction can be provided to everyone. It) 
ensure that large numbers of poor people can participate in loan programs, 
governments must either subsidize the loans (i.e., absorb a large 
percentage of the cost or forgive a portion of the debt) or extend the 
loans over long periods of time. In an inflationary economy with the 
value of the monetary unit dropping daily, the amount of money that will 
be recovered, in real terms, is relatively small.
This has two impacts. First, revolving loans cannot be used unless 
the payments are tied to the inflation rate. If that happens, fewer 
people will qualify or seek loans since the incomes of the poor usually 
increase at a rate slower than the inflation rate. In order to qet people 
to participate in the loans, the rate must usually be fixed. This means 
that the government will virtually have to write off between 50%-70% of 
the loan value (assuming that the inflation rate continues unchecked). At 
some point, the government must realistically decide whether it is more 
economical to give the money away or to administer a loan which will have 
little value after only a short period of time. The cost of loan admin­
istration can be high, and, in an inflationary environment where salaries 
are adjusted to the inflation rate, it may be advisable for the government 
to terminate a twenty-year note after the fourth or fifth year rather than 
continue to administer and collect the amount due.
Hie Mexico City and El Salvador earthquakes reiterate other important 
lessons. Urban reconstruction is primarily an economic problem. The 
majority of people affected most are the poor. For the poor, disasters 
represent lost property, jobs and economic opportunity. In real terms 
they can represent an enormous economic setback. Therefore, 
reconstruction assistance should be designed to:
A - Relieve the Economic Strain and Reduce the Cost of Reconstruction.
This can be done using both direct and indirect approaches. An 
example of a direct approach would be subsidizing the costs of recon­
struction and lowering the cost to the victim. Indirect measures 
mi^it include actions to reduce expenditures in non-disaster-related 
areas, such as lowering the cost of food and other daily purchases, 
thereby freeing people's capital for reconstruction.
B* Iniect Capital into the Community.
In a reconstruction program, vast amounts of money will be taken out 
of the cemimunity as people pay for building materials, supplies and 
services. It is important that the amount of money going out be
replaced by new money coming in. (This is often done through jobs 
programs created for the disaster victims.)
i%6fc»uua!F)yuti:
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C. Create Employment Oppnrhtinif-i ^ .
In the aftermath of a disaster, the affected areas should receive high 
priority for initiatives to provide both full and part-time 
employment.
^• Sigg3prt_aiid Strengthen Existing Economic Enterprises.
It is important to ensure that local small businesses are involved in 
the procurement process. For example, if roofing materials need to be 
purchased, they should be procured from local suppliers, stored in 
local warehouses, and distributed by local transport systems. In the 
long run, the program may be slightly more expensive but the injection 
of this money into the economy will ensure that the socio-economic 
structure remains intact and provide a means for giving indirect 
support to economic reconstruction.
CQNCUJSiqSf
It goes without saying that the economic situation in Mexico and El 
Salvador is not without parallels in other parts of Latin America. 
Coverrmients must be realistic in what they can accomplish in reconstruc­
tion without severely increasing their debt burden. For countries which 
have yet to experience a disaster, however, now is the time to plan ways 
to reduce vulnerability. Risks can be shared between the government and 
the private sector, and a safety net” of economic and administrative 
programs can be developed to reduce losses and reconstruction expenses if 
a disaster occurs. In short, disaster mitigation can be far less 
expensive than major shelter or reconstruction programs.
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